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I. FACTS
In United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000),
defendant, a U.S. citizen employed by the U.S. Air Force as a civilian
postmaster, lived abroad with his family in U.S. military installations in
Japan and the Philippines.' The U.S. Government alleged that defendant
sexually abused his stepdaughter while residing on the military
installations.2 Defendant was prosecuted in a district court for violating a

* This Comment won the award for Best Comment, Spring 2001. I dedicate this to my
parents.
1. United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000). Defendant and his family
resided on the U.S. military base while in Japan, and in a private apartment leased by the U.S.
embassy for its employees while in the Philippines. Id. at 1169.
2. The sexual abuse began when the stepdaughter was 15-years-old and went on for five
years.
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federal statute,3 which proscribed such an act within the "special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."4 Appealing his conviction
at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,' defendant asserted the
district court lacked jurisdiction over crimes committed in foreign
territories." The Ninth Circuit considered the issue and held the district
court had jurisdiction over defendant's act committed on the U.S. military
installations!
II. HISTORY
Courts, on more than one occasion, have recognized the power of
Congress to legislate beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States.' However, the principle that Congress must intend to exercise such
extraterritorial power stems from the presumption of domestic application
of legislation. 9 Therefore, courts are very careful when applying federal

3. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000).
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States... knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act (1) by using force against that person; or
(2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that
any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping;
or attempts to do so, shall be [punished].
Id.

4. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1169.
5. Id.
The conviction was obtained after a second trial, the first one having ended in a hung
jury. Id.
6. Id. The district court granted government's motion to preclude defendant from contesting
jurisdiction at trial. Id. at 1169 n.2.
7. Id. at 1183. Although the jurisdictional issue was affirmed, the district court reversed the
conviction on other grounds. Id. at 1183 n. 11.
8. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991) (dictum) (Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States); see also United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207,211 (2d Cir. 2000).
9. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) ("[T]he presumption is rooted
in a number of considerations, not the least of which is the commonsense notion that Congress
legislates with domestic concerns in mind."); Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248 (applying the
territorial presumption to decline applicability of Title VII to an American employer employing
American citizens abroad); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) ("[L]egislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.").
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criminal statutes to civilians who commit crimes on foreign territory,
unless it is indicated otherwise by clear legislative intent.'0
A. The Bowman Exception to TerritorialPresumption
The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Bowman considered the
efficacy of the territorial presumption regarding a criminal statute that
lacked express grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction." In Bowman, the U.S.
Government charged defendants with conspiracy to defraud a corporation
in which the United States was a stockholder. 2 Because the offenses were
committed on the high seas and within Brazilian territory, defendants
claimed that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the case.' 3 The
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and found that it did have jurisdiction. 4
Defining the issue as one of legislative intent," the Bowman Court
announced an exception: for certain criminal statutes, such as those
implicating the U.S. Government's right to protect itself, jurisdiction
should be inferred from the nature of the crime.' 6 The Bowman Court
inferred jurisdiction because the statute under which defendants were
indicted was enacted primarily to protect the government against frauds,
which are just as likely to occur outside U.S. territory as within.'
B. United States v. Erdos: ' StretchingJurisdiction?
Legislative intent was also a determinative factor in the extraterritorial
application of a criminal statute in UnitedStatesv. Erdos.However, Erdos

10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1986).
11. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922).
12. Id. at 95. Section 35 of the Criminal Code (1918), 40 Stat. 1015, prohibited fraud on the
government, including corporations in which the government was a stockholder. Bowman, 260 U.S.
at 103 n.1.
13. Id. at 96-97.
14. Id. at 102-03. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to rule on whether the district court had

jurisdiction over one of the defendants who was not an American citizen but could not be
apprehended at the time of the trial. Id.
15. This is based on the principle that Congress usually intends to apply statutes domestically.
Id. at 97-98; see sources cited supranote 9.
16. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. The distinction arose where the nature of the crime which was

"not logical dependent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because
of the right of the Government to defend itself." Id. at 98.

17. Id. The corporation was engaged in transportation business in which its vessels traveled
on the high seas and to foreign ports all over the world. Id. at 102.
18. 474 F.2d 157, 158 (4th Cir. 1973).
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presented some issues not present in Bowman. 9 In Erdos, a U.S. employee
of the U.S. embassy in Guinea was charged with manslaughter "within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" under 18
U.S.C. § 7(3). 20 Section 7(3) defines the "special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States as, "[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for
the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired.., by
consent of the legislature of the State."'"
In determining whether the district court had jurisdiction over the
defendant's case,22 the Fourth Circuit decided to interpret the statute
broadly 23 and derived two jurisdictional categories: domestic and
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The first two clauses contained one category
and the third clause contained another. 24 The circuit court reasoned that
because the second clause clearly applied only within U.S. territory, the
first category of "lands reserved . . . and under . . . its concurrent
jurisdiction," under which the embassy fell, applied extraterritorially to the
embassy.2

19. In Erdos, the criminal statute prohibited certain acts against private individuals and a
jurisdictional statement, although not its definition, which was within the text of the statute. See
Bowman, 260 U.S. at 100 n.1; Erdos, 474 F.2d at 159 n.L.
20. Erdos, 474 F.2d at 159 n.l; 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2000).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (2000).
22. This was done without any reference to the territorial presumption for crimes against
private individuals mentioned in Bowman. See Erdos, 474 F.2d at 158-60.
23. On its face, the Fourth Circuit could not determine whether the statute applied only to the
strict boundaries of the United States. Id. at 159. The circuit court admitted that Congress may not
have even considered the issue of extraterritoriality. Id. at 159-60. Because the Fourth Circuit
admitted the statutory language and legislative history of § 7(3) was ambiguous, the circuit court
adopted the broad interpretation based on the permissive power of Congress to enact statutes
extending beyond territorial United States for conduct by American citizens. Id.
24. Id. at 160. It reasoned that the first two phrases in § 7(3) were connected by an "and,"
whereas the third phrase was separated from the first two by an "or" and a comma, the third phrase
was independent from the first two phrases and thus it was the only category requiring consent of
state legislatures. Id.
25. Id. The Fourth Circuit said that absolute ownership was not required for the embassy
building to be part of the U.S. territory. Id. at 159. Hence, even though the building was leased, the
circuit court found sufficient dominion over the embassy to characterize it as having been "acquired
for the use of the United States" and "under concurrent jurisdiction thereof." Id.
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C. United States v. Gatlin: A JurisdictionalGap
In UnitedStates v. Gatlin, the Second Circuit specifically rejected the
Erdos decision concerning the extraterritoriality of § 7(3).26 In Gatlin, the
U.S. Government charged a civilian defendant, who lived on a U.S.
military base in Germany," for violating a federal statute which prohibited
sexual abuse in the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States., 28 However, the Gatlin court sustained defendant's
objection that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his crime, holding
that § 7(3) did not apply to conduct outside the territorial United States.29
As in Erdos,the Gatlincourt observed that the applicability of the criminal
statute to defendant's conduct depended on the extraterritoriality of
§ 7(3).30 Unlike Erdos however, the Gatlin court sought to derive
legislative intent where it was not indicated in the statute by applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 3 1The Gatlin court then determined
26. United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 2000).
27. Id. at 209-10. The U.S. military had a leasing agreement with Germany that gave the
military "exclusive use" over the housing complex. Id. at 209.
28. Id. at 210. The Government charged the 34-year-old defendant with having sexual
intercourse with his then 13-year-old stepdaughter. Id. Like 18 U.S.C. § 11 12(b) (2000) under
which defendant in Erdos was charged, § 2243(a) also incorporated § 7(3) by reference so that its
applicability to defendant depended on the interpretation of § 7(3). Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 210 n.3.
18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) states:
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
...knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who (1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and
(2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so,
shall be [punished].
18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (2000).
29. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at210.
30. Id. Therefore, whether the military installation met the statutory definition of the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and whether the United States exercised "exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction" over it, were questions that the Second Circuit found necessary to answer
only if § 7(3) applied extraterritorially. Id. at 212 n.6.
31. Id. at 211 (quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173 (1993)). The
Gatlincourt criticized Erdos for not applying the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 215.
But cf United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973) (not mentioning presumption against
extraterritoriality at all in its discussion). The Gatlin court explained that this case was different
from Bowman type crimes where the presumption need not apply even without clear congressional
intent. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 211 n.5; see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)
(applying the presumption to tort claims arising in Antarctica under FTCA and stating that it is "the
commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind"). But cf
United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189,206 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that presumption
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that the language and structure of the statute was not clear and rejected the
Erdos interpretation that § 7(3) applied extraterritorially.32 Instead, against
the statutory ambiguity and backdrop of extraterritoriality presumption, the
Gatlin court studied the legislative history of §7(3), although it derived no
clear legislative intent.33 As a result, the Gatlin court held that § 7(3) did

only applied to provisions that defined offenses, but not to jurisdictional statutes, where instead,
standard method of statutory construction should be applied).
32. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 215.
It hardly follows logically from the court's two unobjectionable premises namely, that the two parts of § 7(3) are independent and that the second part, by
its terms, applies exclusively to lands within the United States -that the first part
of § 7(3) must or should apply extraterritorially. In fact, from the face of the
statute, it is equally possible that the first and second parts of § 7(3), though
independent of each other, both were meant to apply exclusively to places within
the United States.
Id.
33. Id. at 216-20. The Gatlin court examined three main precursors leading to § 7(3). Id.
From the Act of April 30, 1790 (1790 Act) ch. 9, § 3, 1 Stat. 113 (1790), which provided within
the text of the statute jurisdiction for certain crimes committed within certain places "under the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," the Gatlin court derived the conclusion that
jurisdiction was limited to territorial United States. Gatlin,216 F.3d at 216-17. Next, it turned to
the Act of March 4, 1909 (1909 Act) ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909), which had a separate provision
defining in § 272 "the admiralty and maritime and the territorial jurisdiction of the United States"
to include
any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and
under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise
acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which
the same shall be, for the erection of a fort.
Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 217. Again, because the statutory language indicated places over which the
United States had exclusivejurisdiction, the Gatlincourt concluded that there was no congressional
intent for the statute to apply extraterritorially. Id. at 218. Finally, in amending the 1909 Act,
Congress enacted the Act of June 11, 1940 (1940 Act) ch. 323, 54 Stat. 304 (1940) which gave §
7(3) its present form, whereby "exclusive use" was changed to "use," and "exclusive jurisdiction"
to "exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction." Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 219. However, the Gatlin court
asserted that this change did not affect Congress's intent not to extend the statute extraterritorially
and that the "concurrent jurisdiction" was added to reach certain federal reservations, not to reach
offenses committed extraterritorially. Id. at 219. See also Jordan J. Paust, Comment, Nonof "SpecialTerritorialJurisdiction"ofthe UnitedStates:ForgottenHistoryand
Extraterritoriality
the ErrorsofErdos, 24 YALE J.INT'L. 305, 321 (1999) (stating that legislative history indicates that
the focus was on "owned land and geographically limited territorial jurisdiction").
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not apply extraterritorially and accordingly
defendant could not be
34
punished under the criminal statute.
III. THE INSTANT CASE
In United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1171, the instant court held
that § 7(3) applies extraterritorially, thus confirming the discord among the
U.S. circuit courts on the meaning of the provision "special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States," defined in § 7(3).35 Moreover,
the instant court explicitly rejected Gatlin'sholding and reasoning, despite
the striking similarity of legal issues and facts between the two cases. 6
Although the instant court recognized that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should apply in most statutes, it explained that this
presumption did not apply in cases where it was not helpful in realizing
congressional intent."
Specifically, the instant court observed that the justifications for
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply in the
instant case. Distinguished from "inherently domestic" statutes, where
limiting the reach to the territorial United States made sense, § 7(3) was
specifically a jurisdictional statute3" where extraterritorial reach did not

34. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 220. In explaining the implications of its decision, the Gatlin court
noted that foreign countries usually prosecute civilians like defendants who commit crimes in their
countries. Id. at 223. However, how "usually" this actually happens is questionable. See 146 CONG.
REc.S I1181 (2000) (discussing the unlikelihood of an American national being prosecuted by a
foreign government). The Gatlin court asserted that its decision was consistent with the generally
accepted view that there existed a "jurisdictional gap" for crimes committed abroad by civilians.
See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 220-23 (stating that the gap was recognized by "all three branches of the
federal government" and was evidenced in statutory history). See also Paust, supranote 33, at 306
(noting the jurisdictional gap concerning conduct of U.S. civilians abroad). The Gatlin court
forwarded a copy of the decision to Congress so that Congress, not the courts, can decide whether
to close this gap. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 223.
35. Until the instant case, there have been only two circuit court decisions on the issue. See
Erdos, 474 F.2d at 157 (holding that § 7(3) applies extraterritorially); Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 220
(holding that § 7(3) does not apply extraterritorially). See also United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d
1166, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000) (McKeown, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority has created a circuit
split on the presumption against extraterritoriality by departing from Gatlin).
36. See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1172-76 (rebutting Gatlin'sinterpretation of statutory history and
statutory construction and decision on extraterritoriality of § 7(3)).
37. Id. at 1170.
38. Id. at 1171 ("Unlike ordinary domestic statutes, jurisdictional statutes inherently present
the question of how far Congress wishes U.S. law to extend. There is therefore no reason to
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create jurisdictional conflict with a foreign sovereign.39 Instead, the instant
court articulated that it was enough to construe legislative intent by
examining the statute itself and its legislative history. 40 Even if the
presumption applied legislative intent for the extraterritoriality of § 7(3)
was evidenced by its statutory language, structure, and legislative history.4'
In determining legislative intent, the instant court decided that on its
face, the language "specialmaritime and territorial jurisdiction" indicated
42
' Second, because
that the jurisdiction was not limited to the "ordinary."
all other subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 7 extended the jurisdiction beyond the
territorial United States, the instant court determined that the section as a
whole applied extraterritorially.43 Furthermore, the instant court believed
that the change of language in the precursor to § 7(3) resulted in an
extension to the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and was

presume that Congress did, or did not, mean to act extraterritorially."). See also United States v.
Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refusing to apply the presumption to
jurisdictional statutes such as § 7(3) because it said that the presumption was meant to apply to
provision defining offenses).
39. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171. In the instant case, the instant court stated that there would be
no international conflict because, by nature of the statute, § 7(3) would comprise the foreign
territory only where the United States had legislative control. Id.; see also Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991) (stating that the desire to
avoid international conflict supports the territorial presumption absent contrary intent).
40. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171; see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)
(stating that courts need to look at all available evidence to determine congressional intent); Bin
Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 206 n.33 ("When presented with the task of interpreting jurisdictional
statutes such as Section 7(3), courts should simply employ the standard tools of statutory
interpretation: analysis of text, structure and legislative history.").
41. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171. But cf Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 212-16 (concluding that
although the territorial presumption did not apply, statutory language and legislative history
indicated that § 7(3) did not apply extraterritorially).
42. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171 (emphasis added).
43. Id. ("Section 7 as a whole extends the jurisdiction of the United States to the ends of the
earth (and beyond)."). For example, § 7(1) applies to high seas and § 7(6) applies to outer space.
See 18 U.S.C. § 7. But other courts have reached the opposite conclusion by the fact that Congress
granted extraterritorial jurisdiction in other subsections. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
204 (1993) (proposing that Congress knows how to givejurisdiction if it wants to); Corey, 232 F.3d
at 1190-91 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (stating that the fact Congress specifically provided for
jurisdiction in all the other subsections negates the instant court's proposition that § 7(3) applies
extraterritorially); United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 216 n. I1(2d Cir. 2000) (indicating that
the subsections should be interpreted separately since they were enacted separately with their own
histories).
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indicative of its extraterritoriality."' Therefore, concluding that there was
evidence of requisite legislative intent and that the installations were
"reserved or acquired for the use of the United States" and "under the
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof," the instant court held that
they were within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. 4 5

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Applicability of TerritorialPresumptionto § 7(3)

Much of the discord among the U.S. circuit and district courts involved
the applicability of the territorial presumption to § 7(3).46 This aspect was

important in the instant case because of the strong disagreement between
the lower courts over the issue, due to the conceded ambiguity of the
statute and its legislative history.4" Essentially, the major factor regarding
§ 7(3) was whether jurisdictional statutes, like the statute at issue in
Bowman, 8 are somehow different from general legislation requiring
exemptions from the territorial presumption. 9
44. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1175. The instant court purported that adding "concurrent" to the
language in the 1940 Act tended to show that Congress intended not only to extend to lands under
concurrent authority of the states, but also that of other countries. Id.
45. Id. at 1176 ("Congress rebuts the territorial presumption simply by demonstrating that
it drafted the statute with extraterritorial concerns in mind."). The instant court was not influenced
by the fact that Congress enacted Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of 2000: "We doubt whether
the beliefs of subsequent legislatures have any bearing upon the interpretation of a statute already
on the books." Id. at 1173 n.3 (emphasis added).
46. The dissent in the instant case criticized the majority for creating a circuit split by
refusing to apply the territorial presumption to § 7(3) as in Gatlin. However, a more accurate
characterization is that it was actually Gatlin that created the split after Bowman, where the
presumption that was discussed preceded Erdos; see United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98
(1922), and Erdos, which decided purposely that the presumption was irrelevant and thus
inapplicable. See United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 169 (4th Cir. 1973) (discussing Bowman
but not referring to the presumption).
47. See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171; cf Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 211; see also United States v. Bin
Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 206 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
48. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (Generally, for criminal statutes prescribing conduct against
private individuals, Congress must intend to apply them extraterritorially, but making an exception
for crimes against the government).
49. See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171 ("[Jlurisdictional statutes inherently present the question of
how far Congress wishes U.S. law to extend."); see also Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 206 n.32
(declining to apply the presumption to jurisdictional statutes).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

9

FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal of
International
Law,
Vol. 14, Iss.LAW
3 [2002], Art. 5

[Vol. 14

The instant court adopted the view that jurisdictional statutes are
different, but rigid reading of Bowman is not warranted when considering
whether a criminal prosecution is permissible when the conduct in
question occurs outside the territorial United States.5° The lack of an
express legislative grant in the statute has been a hurdle in all relevant
cases. 5 The instant court distinguished § 7(3) from "inherently domestic"
statutes where the presumption applied, because although § 7(3) was a
jurisdictional statute in form, its actual purpose was to serve as a reference
to criminal statutes, which are "inherently domestic."52 Unlike the crime
in Bowman, the offense in the instant case was against a private
individual.53 Although the government may have interests in preventing
international tension created when its citizens commit crimes on foreign
territory, the critical distinction in Bowman was that the government was
protecting itself against harm, not just furthering its interests.54 Hence, the
principle that the legislative interpretation should be guided by territorial
presumption where extraterritorial jurisdiction is not specifically conferred
is frustrated to the extent that an exception can be made for such
"jurisdictional" statutes.5
B. Reexamining CongressionalIntent
Whether with or without the backdrop of the territorial presumption,
the primary task of the instant court was to determine legislative intent
from the statute and its legislative history.56 However, how to decipher the
statute's ambiguity generated much debate.5" Erdos' broad interpretation

50. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 212 n.6 (stating that the territorial presumption still applies to
jurisdictional statutes such as § 7(3) because the issue is whether the criminal statute which
defendant is charged with applies extraterritorially).
51. See, e.g., Corey, 232 F.3dat 1170.
52. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 212 n.6; cf supratext accompanying note 38.
53. See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1169.
54. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94,94 (1922) (focusing on government's right
to protect itself). The instant court's interpretation of Bowman as holding that "territorial
presumption does not govern... where implicates legitimate interests of the United States abroad"
is a stretch. See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1187 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (asserting that the instant case
went too far in construing Bowman as it did).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 30.
56. See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171 (citing United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d, 189,206
n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
57. Id. at 1191 (McKeown, J., dissenting) ("This statute is a poster-child for ambiguity every court attempting to construe and harmonize the statute goes through contortions trying to
explain what Congress meant but did not say.").
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of § 7(3) was not espoused by the instant court, nor by other authorities.5"
However, the instant court's own propositions, most of which were based
on the fact that all other subsections of § 7 describe places beyond the
territorial United States, did not elicit a definitive legislative intent on
extraterritoriality.59
Nor does the legislative history particularly clarify the ambiguity: both
the instant court 0 and the Gatlin court" exhaustively examined the three
key precursors of § 7(3), and reached opposite conclusions. Basically, the
purpose behind the legislative rewriting of the precursor of § 7(3) to
require "exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction" was unknown, therefore
lending support to neither proposition.62 Prior to this, the focus of other
antecedents was "exclusive" jurisdiction, which cut against
extraterritoriality.63
The change, prompted by a U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning
states' concurrent jurisdiction over lands acquired by the United States,
showed that Congress did not have foreign territory in mind.6 However,
the instant court made no effort to rebut the logical corollary of this
evidence, nor did it substantiate its proposition that Congress intended to
extend federal jurisdiction beyond that of the states, until it was concurrent
with foreign jurisdiction. 65 Given that there is little historical record
pertaining to legislative intent, courts are left to speculate on what

58. The instant court, in construing § 7(3), makes no mention of Erdos' proposition that
because the third clause in § 7(3) is independent and applies only territorially, that makes the first
two clauses apply extraterritorially. See id. at 1171-72.
59. Id. at 1171. The instant court said, that "t]aken as a whole, 18 U.S.C. § 7 extends the
jurisdiction of the federal criminal laws to areas where American citizens and property need
protection, yet no other government effectively safeguards those interests." Id.
60. See infra § III and accompanying notes.
61. See discussion supra note 33.
62. For example, Gatlin concluded that Congress's purpose in changing the language was
unrelated to foreign territory, so it did not effect the legislative intent not to apply § 7(3)
extraterritorially. See United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 219-20 (2d Cir. 2000).
63. Id. at 216-20; see also discussion supra note 33.
64. Id. at 220 n. 14. (stating that House and Senate Reports of the 1940 Act show that the
change in legislation was a response to a U.S. Supreme Court decision unrelated to foreign
territory).
65. The instant court resorted to historical reconstruction of the expansionist era: "As the
United States acquired new possessions, Congress extended federal criminal jurisdiction with the
boundaries of the young republic." United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d, 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Congress might have intended. Nonetheless, the lack of evidence
pertaining to Congress's extraterritorial concerns in the available record
negates the instant court's conclusion.66
C. ImplicationsofUnited States v. Corey and the Military
ExtraterritorialJurisdictionAct of2000
The circuit split creates the peculiar possibility that, depending on the
circuit, one person could be prosecuted for a crime committed abroad
while the other could commit the same crime and avoid prosecution.67
Although the U.S. Supreme Court could verify these different legal
consequences, Congress recently clarified the issue by enacting a
jurisdictional statute that grants jurisdiction over persons accompanying
U.S. military personnel abroad.6" The statute, which was Congress's
' and a response Gatlin's "novel
concession to fill a "jurisdictional gap"69
interpretation" of territorial jurisdiction, 0 covers persons like the
defendant in the instant case. Therefore, the new statute eliminates any
future debate over the extraterritoriality of § 7(3).71
However, the instant court's decision remains a precedent for situations
not covered by the statute. For example, it is plausible that a non-employee
or a person not accompanying the U.S. military personnel could engage in
criminal conduct in a foreign territory within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' Thus, a court following the
instant court's approach may still create an extension of extraterritorial
jurisdiction regarding criminal conduct committed abroad that is otherwise
not allowable under 18 U.S.C. § 3261.73

66. There were only three pages of Congressional Report on all of the 1940 Act. See id. at
1173; Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 219-20; United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922); see also
United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 210-211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) and supranote 35. But
see Paust, supra note 33, at 321 (asserting that history supports non-extraterritoriality).
67. In fact, this was exactly what happened in Gatlin and Corey.See Corey, 232 F.2d at 1166;
Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 207.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
69. See 146 CONG. REc. SI1181, SI1183 (2000).
70. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 210.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
72. The statute was enacted at time of instant court, but the Ninth Circuit said that what
subsequent Congress has done is not a reflection on prior Congress's intent. See Corey, 232 F.3d
at 1173 n.3.
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
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V. CONCLUSION

The courts' cautious approaches towards extending jurisdiction beyond
the territorial United States without an explicit legislative grant is based
not only on the principle that Congress legislates with domestic concerns
in mind, but also on the desire to avoid international clashes.74
Consequently, whenever courts construe statutes concerning or prohibiting
criminal conduct on foreign territory, they must determine whether such
an extension is reasonable" and warranted by considering all relevant
factors, such as statutory language, legislative history, the territorial
presumption, and the nature of the crime.76 Although the instant court
purported to have done so, the notion that defendant should not avoid
punishment for the alleged crime because of jurisdictional deficiencies
silently guided the court's analysis.' Despite § 3261 foreclosing much, if
not all, of the uncertainty and debate surrounding federal jurisdiction over
civilians committing crimes in foreign territory, the instant court's
approach toward construing legislative intent increases the possibility of
judicial encroachment on the legislative domain."8

74. See id. § 3261(b).
75. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403. (1986) (stating "reasonableness"

as a limitation on jurisdiction over conduct committed outside territorial United States, and
prescribing relevant factors, e.g., consistency with international law, another state's interest in
regulating, and connection between the regulating state and the person).
76. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (dealing with evidence relevant in statutory construction).
77. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1176 ("[C]onstruing subsection 7(3) as applying only to federal lands
within the United States serves neither congressional intent nor American foreign policy. All it does
is hand a get-out-of-jail-free card to American civilians who violate U.S. law while stationed
abroad.").
78. Defendants, who would have been brought under criminal statutes that incorporate § 7(3),
can now be brought under the new statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000). Decision to extend or limit
jurisdiction is the role of Congress, although courts can direct Congress's attention to an issue that

courts cannot resolve. See United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 223 (2d Cir. 2000); 146 CONG.
REC. S11181, S 11183 (2000) (statement by senator Leahy that Gatlin was a "wake-up call" to
Congress to close the jurisdictional gap).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

13

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 5

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol14/iss3/5

14

